SECRET/NODIS (XLDS)

October 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

WILLIAM B. QUANDT W.B.

DONALD J. STUKEL

SUBJECT:

WSAG Meeting, October 8, 1973, 5:30 p.m.

The main items on the agenda for today's WSAG meeting will be the following:

- -- Situation Report
- -- Israeli Arms Requests
- -- Status of Libyan Contingency Study
- -- Status of Oil Contingency Study
- -- Jordan's Possible Involvement in the Fighting

The <u>Israeli arms requests</u> may be the most sensitive issue. They have apparently asked for 40 F-4s and 300 M 60 tanks, as well as some smaller equipment. Because of the signal it would give to the Soviets and Arabs, we will not want to make commitments on the larger items now. Even after the fighting, we will not want to be the first ones to engage in a massive resupply effort. There are some grounds for thinking the Soviets may be more restrained this time than in 1967.

The smaller Israeli requests -- ammunition, CBUs, ECM, sidewinders -- are in a different category, since they might be handled secretly and could actually affect the course of the battle. If we decide to grant these requests, we must try for total secrecy. This means Israeli aircraft landing at night at designated airfields to attract minimum attention.

The tabs in this book cover the main issues:

- -- Situation Report
- -- United Nations Activity
- -- Libya Contingency Paper
- -- Oil Contingency Paper
- -- Evacuation
- -- Cables

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Situation Report

Attached is an early afternoon status report and a CIA situation report. They state that the Israelis have gone on the offensive on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts; that Israeli casualties since the war started appear to have been substantial; that Jordanian entry into the war remains a strong possibility; and that there have been no new moves today by other Arab countries or by the Soviets toward active involvement. The Israeli Chief of Staff said this evening that Israeli forces have retaken most of the territory the Syrians had taken in the Golan Heights, and that the Israeli offensive on the Egyptian front was making good progress but had not yet crossed to the western bank of the Suez Canal.

- -- Does everyone agree with the CIA/DIA estimate that the fighting will have turned decisively in the Israelis' favor very shortly?
- -- Does anyone see a serious possibility, for example, of prolonged indecisive fighting? Of Israeli forces getting trapped on the west bank of the Canal?
- -- Do we foresee involvement by the other Arab countries on a scale that could seriously prolong the war or affect the outcome?
- -- Will the chances of other Arab involvement increase or decrease with an Israeli rout of the Egyptians and Syrians?
- -- What can we do now to reduce the danger of Jordanian or Lebanese entry into the war?

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United Nations Activity

Ambassador Scali's speech is included at this tab.

The key issues to be considered now are when and whether we will want to take a more specific position on the terms of a ceasefire and when we might want to table a resolution. The position of other parties appears to be as follows:

- -- Egypt continues to feel that a ceasefire must be linked to a settlement which results in Israel's withdrawal from from the occupied territories.
- -- The Europeans are meeting to develop a common position, but have not reached any conclusions yet.
- -- The Israelis will show little interest in a ceasefire unless it involves withdrawal to the previous lines.

- -- Ambassador Scali has given a speech at the UN which is deliberately vague on terms of a ceasefire. Until the situation on the ground is a bit clearer, we will stick to this position. It is possible that some minor changes in the ceasefire line, especially on the Syrian front, could be accepted by both sides, so we do not want to tie our hands in advance. Nonetheless, the general point of favoring the restoration of the status quo ante remains.
- -- We have not yet tabled a resolution. At what point in the fighting would it make most sense to do so?
- -- The British have just passed us language for a possible compromise resolution that they would table tomorrow. It would call for "immediacessation of hostilities in order to create conditions in which rapid progress could be made toward a peaceful settlement in accordance with resolution 242." The British see this as a possible compromise between the position they assume we will take and what the Arabs with support from the non-aligned will go for. Could we work with this resolution to make it more acceptable?

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Libya Contingency Paper

The JCS continues to work on the contingency plan to evacuate the American community from Libya. (We have not received a copy of the plan yet.]

Summary of Plan: The plan has two options: (1) evacuate and withdraw, and (2) evacuate and remain. The concept envisages seizure of Tripoli International Airport (less defended than Wheelus Air Base) and an area near Benghazi in order to evacuate Americans in the Gulf of Sidra area and from the desert. The Americans are concentrated in the Tripoli area (mainly in Georgimpopoli which is 21 miles from the airport), but perhaps as many as 500 are scattered in the oil ports along the Gulf of Sidra and the oil installations in the desert.

The Marine Battal ion landing team from the Sixth Fleet would carry out the evacuation in the Benghazi area while simultaneously the 82nd Airborne would seize the International Airport at Tripoli. The landing would take place about 28 hours after the order to execute the plan (assumes forces are on alert).

Talking Points

-- Ask Admiral Moorer how the work on the plan is progressing (when will we receive it)? [There is no indication of problems in Libya. Qadhafi's speech yesterday was restrained.]

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Oil Contingency

Oil apparently continues to flow normally from the Middle East, with yesterday's Iraqi nationalizations of two U.S. concerns the only actions against U.S. companies. Iraq and the fedayeen have called on Arab oil producing countries to cut off oil supplies to the U.S. and other countries supporting Israel.

Treasury and NSC are preparing a paper on Presidential options on how to adjust to a loss of Arab oil to the U.S. The paper will include actions that could be undertaken immediately such as:

- -- Mandatory allocation of all oil products.
- -- A voluntary conservation program.
- -- Surge production of dome stic crude.
- -- Steps of longer range impact, such as rationing and switching to alternate fuels (e.g. coal, which would require relaxed environmental standards).

The first draft of this paper will be completed by Tuesday evening.

- -- Based on Qadhafi's statement yesterday and today, he appeared to be miffed and at odds with the rest of the Arabs. The chances of an Arab oil cutoff appear to be low for the moment.
- -- [to Colby] Do you have any indications of an impending Arab cut off of oil?
- -- What will happen as the Israelis begin to push the Arabs back?
- -- If a cut off occurs, the President will be forced to take drastic action on several points. Treasury and NSC staff are working up a series of possible actions. [to Simon] Will the work be ready by tomorrow as promised? What sort of actions will be recommended?
- -- If a cut off occurs, the Arabs might try to force it on the U.S. only. Shouldn't we be going out to the Allies to enlist allied support if such

an attempt is made? [In June 1967, it was increased U.S. dome stic production which helped fill the gap created by the closure of the Suez.]

-- It might be difficult in practice for the Arabs to boycott only the U.S. Crude oil and refined products could be reshuffled among consumers. [To Colby] Could CIA give us a paper by tomorrow on whether the Arabs could successfully boycott only the U.S.?

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Evacuation

All U.S. embassies in the area are reviewing their evacuation contingencies (full list of Amcit communities attached). None has as yet reported any problems for U.S. citizens as a result of current hostilities.

- -- How likely is it we will have to evacuate?
- -- From where?
- -- Are we prepared?